Previous studies have found that left-wing and libertarian individuals are more likely to engage in extra-institutional political activism. However, due to a lack of suitable data, studies to date have not analysed the relative influence of economic redistributive and social libertarian values for the intensity of protest participation. By analysing data from a unique cross-national dataset on participants in mass demonstrations in seven countries, this article addresses this gap in the literature and provides evidence of the relative impact of economic redistributive and social libertarian values in explaining different degrees of protest participation. We show that there are divergent logics underpinning the effect of the two value sets on extra-institutional participation. While both economically redistributive and libertarian social values support extra-institutional participation, economically redistributive protesters are mobilized to political action mainly through organizations, whereas the extra-institutional participation of social libertarian protesters is underpinned by their dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy.
Introduction
Progressive values can relate to either economic redistributive or social libertarian claims. This study analyses the extent to which protest activism is underpinned by either set of values. Previous research has tended to argue that more progressive values underpin extra-institutional political participation (Welzel and Deutsch, 2012) . The literature on political attitudes has identified two different value dimensions: an economic redistributive-free market dimension and a libertarianauthoritarian social values dimension (Tilley, 2005) . The context of the recent economic crisis provides fertile ground for such an examination because many scholars have argued that the 'cultural turn' in social movement activism has been redirected through a focus on inequality and redistributive concerns in the wake of the Great Recession (Giugni and Grasso 2015b; Grasso and Giugni 2016a) . As Fligstein and McAdam argue, events that affect large numbers of non-state fields such as large-scale economic crises can 'undermine the power of incumbents and grant leverage to challengers… but even in more settled times, there are routine, low-level conflicts going on constantly in state and nonstate strategic action fields' (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 76) .
As has been shown previously, one of the primary challenges for social movement 'organizational entrepreneurs' is to redefine the 'rules of the game' and the terms of debate in wider society. The first step in this process involves the realisation that present conditions are subject to change and that concerted social and political action is amenable to reconfiguring these conditions (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) . The collective identity-formation of social movements plays a large role in this process (Polletta and Jasper, 2001) . At the individual level, ideology and value commitments recognising the potential for alternative social arrangements are key (McAdam, 1986) .
While both economic redistributive and social liberal values tend to be associated with the progressive end of the spectrum of political beliefs, these two types of value commitments do not need to go hand in hand, nor do they imply similar underlying logics of belief. While a more redistributive economic policy implies a greater need for governmental action to control, plan and manage the economy, in contrast a more social liberal agenda implies the state withdrawing from the private sphere to a greater extent. As such, one would expect two different logics to be in play in the extent to which leftist and libertarian values promote protest politics. Supporters of economic redistribution could be seen to be more likely to use protest as a political resource (Lipsky, 1968) , as marginalised groups struggling to making inroads by other means and thus increase their bargaining ability by using protest actions as a reliable political tool to establish a group voice in the political arena (Gillion, 2013) . Instead, for libertarians protest could be seen as an end in itself, the objective expression of anti-authoritarianism and their dissatisfaction with the political process, particularly in times of crisis (Giugni and Grasso 2018a) .
Rising government surveillance across the globe is another trend contributing to anti-government protest (Tarrow, 2015) . Today, as governments increasingly come under fire from contenders from both the radical left and the populist right, these trends have fed into wider perceptions of a legitimation crisis in advanced Western democracies and the end of the post-war (WWII) settlement (Giugni and Grasso 2018b) . In particular, there is an expansion of surveillance, 'to those whose activities are merely related to an ongoing investigation, as opposed to raising probably cause of actual involvement in illegal activity' an this 'has brought additional civil liberties under attack: freedom of association, privacy, the right to a fair trial, and access to government information' (Braman, 2006: 115) .
Despite the ubiquity of protest in contemporary society only a handful of studies distinguish between levels of protest, and whether the extent to which one holds certain types of values can explain differences in degrees of protest is still largely unknown. Most quantitative studies of protest participation tend to focus on the distinction between protesters and non-protesters, making no distinction between individuals who are engaged in a great number of unconventional acts and those who instead only engage in a few (Grasso 2011 . In this paper we make use of a novel and unique dataset collected in the context of a collaborative European project, which allows us to distinguish between degrees of protest (Saunders et al., 2012) The new and rich dataset we used to analyse these theoretical questions contains survey data on over 10,000 activists attending 71 demonstrations in seven Western European countries between 2009 and 2013 . In what follows we first review theories that are linked to understanding the relationship between protest and values; we move on to discussing our data and methods; we then discuss findings from multi-level models; and, finally, we discuss the implications of our results for our understanding of the relationship between protest and values in industrial societies.
Previous research
Since the student movements of the 1960s and 1970s, protest activism and extra-institutional forms of political participation have become ubiquitous in post-industrial societies (van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001) . Several studies from both political sociology and political science have argued that post-industrial citizens prefer these new modes of campaigning to more traditional types of institutional participation such as voting and party membership (Dalton et al., 2010; della Porta, 2015; McAdam et al., 2001; Norris, 2002) . This shift in modes of political engagement is often linked to changing political values (Grasso 2018; Grasso et al. 2017a) . A number of authors have argued that societal modernization leads to the rise of progressive values conducive to extra-institutional political action (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Norris, 2002) . Research has shown a strong link between progressive values and protest across post-industrial democracies (Dalton et al., 2010) . These values are particularly important predictors of activism in affluent, advanced democracies (Dalton and Rohrschneider, 2002) .
The role of ideological orientations for political engagement is acknowledged in the literature, with protest activism being seen as more common among those identifying with the Left (Dalton et al., 2010) . There is also evidence from the United States that liberals are more likely to engage in protest activism (Dalton, 2008) . It has been shown in the literature that individuals with more left-libertarian political values are more likely to engage in the new Green or New Left parties and social movements such as those focusing on the environment and women's and LGBT rights emerging since the late 1960s (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Kitschelt, 1988; Kriesi et al., 1992 Kriesi et al., , 1995 . These values also have a role in differentiating participants in different types of movements (Giugni and Grasso 2015a; Grasso and Giugni 2016b) .
Both political sociologists and political scientists include measures of liberal values in models to explain participation in social movement activities (Verba et al., 1997) . Studies in political sociology have, importantly, distinguished between two different value dimensions: economic redistributive-free market, and social libertarian-authoritarian (Evans et al., 1996; Tilley, 2005) . However, studies of political participation do not make a clear distinction between the economic redistributive-free market and social libertarian-authoritarian dimensions. As such, while there is disparate evidence that social libertarian and economic redistributive values all impact on protest activism, it remains unclear whether the same processes underpin the impact of different values on various types and intensities of protest participation.
We agree with scholars arguing that it is important to understand what explains different levels of protest activism (Klandermans, 1997; Passy and Giugni, 2001; Saunders et al., 2012; Verhulst and Walgrave, 2009) . Considering the ubiquity of protest in advanced democracies, it has become particularly important to understand what distinguishes the occasional from the 'stalwart' protester, and the extent to which different types of political and social values impact on one's proclivity to become a habitual protester. Moreover, there is also evidence that ideological radicalism -of both the Left and Right -is linked to protest activism, with support for extremist parties positively linked to the level of protest once other national characteristics were taken into account (Dalton and van Sickle, 2005; Powell, 1982) . As such, it is important to examine the extent to which attachment to certain values affects both the frequency and the intensity of protest activism. By speaking to these critical new questions in the study of protest and political participation, this paper breaks new ground, while also speaking to classical debates in political science on the role of political values for political action, which date back at least to the seminal work of Almond and Verba (1963) .
While the literature on political participation and social movements distinguishes between economic redistributive and libertarian social values and understands their role for spurring on protest in different ways, the literature to date has yet to elucidate the link between values and protest participation by specifically distinguishing between the redistributive-free market and libertarianauthoritarian dimensions. In an attempt to disentangle the different influences of economic and social values on the frequency and intensity of protest activism, we theorise that economically leftist values will be more likely to be linked to the support of state action in society, for example supporting redistribution. In contrast, libertarian social values will be accompanied by a distrust of state action. As a result, we expect that the dynamics underpinning the effect of value sets on various degrees of participation will be different. We hypothesize that redistributive values mobilise to political action mainly through the link with organizations, while with libertarian values we expect that extra-institutional participation will be underpinned by dissatisfaction with democracy and distrust for organised politics. We theorise that individuals who are more economically redistributive are more likely to desire the political intervention of the state to redress distributional inequalities in the population, for example through higher taxes or welfare measures. This means that individuals with greater preferences for economic redistribution are more likely to be institutionally embedded in organisational networks, both the more conventional -parties and trade unions -and the more unconventional -social movement organisations. In contrast, individuals who are more social libertarian are more likely to distrust state intervention and regulation in society and as such will be more likely to participate out of feelings of frustration with what they perceive as the unsatisfactory (un-)democratic standards in the nation, in an attempt to voice their concerns.
Our hypotheses are thus as follows:
H1: Economic redistributive values have a positive effect on the frequency of extra-institutional participation.

H2: Economic redistributive values have a positive effect on the intensity of extra-institutional participation.
H3: Social libertarian values have a positive effect on the frequency of extra-institutional participation.
H4: Social libertarian values have a positive effect on the intensity of extra-institutional participation.
H5: Organisational membership will be the main variable underpinning the effect of economic redistributive values on both types of extra-institutional participation.
H6: (Dis-)satisfaction with democracy will be the main variable underpinning the effect of social libertarian values on both types of extra-institutional action.
Data and methods
This study analyses data from a unique dataset produced in the context of the project entitled 'Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualising Contestation'. This is a collaborative effort, funded by national funding agencies in each participating country and coordinated through the European Science Foundation (ESF). It originally included seven countries: Belgium, Britain, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, and aimed at studying who participates in demonstrations, why and how. To do so, national teams of researchers conducted on-site surveys among participants in demonstrations between 2009 and 2013, following a rigorous standardized methodology (van Stekelenburg et al., 2012) . A survey questionnaire was handed out following a sampling method aimed at generating random samples of demonstrators. The questionnaire included items concerning previous participation in different kinds of political activities and political values, and other indicators. Details of the demonstrations included are listed here in Appendix 1. The project aimed to survey all the most visible large demonstrations (those attended by more than 3000 estimated protesters) occurring in each participating country between 2009 and 2013. In addition, face-to-face interviews (achieving an almost perfect response rate) were conducted with a sub-sample of respondents to allow for non-response bias checks on the mail-back surveys. The method is presented in detail in van Stekelenburg et al. (2012) . This dataset has been used in a wide variety of publications in top international journals in political science, sociology and specialist fields, such as for example American Journal of Sociology (Walgrave and Wouters, 2014) and Mobilization (Saunders et al., 2012) .
We analysed the full dataset of 71 demonstrations in the seven original Western European countries that conducted the surveys, following the standardized methodology: there were more than 10,000 respondents. While the countries have different political traditions, they are all Western European nations sharing broadly similarities, making this a design of the 'most similar systems', and studies have shown that economic and social values tend to be understood in similar ways across contexts (Dalton, 2008) . The data are hierarchically structured, in order to lend themselves to multilevel analyses in which the individual-level data are nested into the demonstration level which in turn is nested into the country level.
The literature examining extra-institutional participation tends to be limited to a handful of indicators. Early studies, particularly those based on the Political Action Study and on the World or European Values study by Inglehart (1977 Inglehart ( , 1990 and colleagues tended to employ protest potential scales as dependent variables. These types of scales are problematic for investigating the relationship between political values and participation, because the dependent variable includes an attitudinal dimension in the 'might do' option. Individuals who are more left-liberal or post-material will be more likely to say they approve of different sorts of protest activism, without actually engaging in these actions. More recent studies use the only other indicator of extra-institutional participation available in population studies -a dichotomous variable coded as 1 for participation in an activity and 0 for non-participation. However, this variable does not specify the time frame of activism. In addition, there is the problem that one respondent could have conducted the activity a great many times, whereas another might have only participated in it once. As such, this type of question also leaves us agnostic in terms of the relationship between political values and frequency of political activism. Given that only a small portion of the population engages in protest activities at all, asking about frequency of protest in large population studies is not generally feasible because it would lead to very small cell counts, making disaggregated analysis by groups arduous.
We used two new types of indicators of extra-institutional participation: frequency of protest in the last 12 months; and, for intensity, a count measure of the number of extra-institutional activities -other than protest -in which individuals had engaged in the last 12 months. (The activities included were: petitions; boycotting; buying products for political reasons; strike action; direct action; violent forms of action. Principal component analysis showed that all six items loaded on one component with an eigenvalue of 1.7.) This provides both a means for addressing different levels of protest participation and also for investigating the relative impact of values.
To reflect the hierarchical nature of the data, and the fact that respondents were sampled within a demonstration and therefore the fact that their errors are likely to be correlated, we applied twolevel random-intercept models, with the demonstration as the higher level of analysis. Thus, the models in the analysis are four sets of nested, mixed-effects Poisson models accounting for the influence of political, then social, values.
Our key independent variables consist of economic values and social values. For economic values we combined the two Likert items ('Strongly Disagree' to 'Strongly Agree') available in the survey. These ranged from a value of 1, meaning Free market, and a value of 5 meaning Redistributive, from two items: 'Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off' and 'Even the most important public services and industries are best left to private enterprise'. For social values we also combined the two Likert items ('Strongly Disagree' to 'Strongly Agree') available in the survey. These ranged from a value of 1, meaning Authoritarian, and a value of 5, meaning Libertarian, from two items: 'Children should be taught to obey authority' and 'People from other countries should be allowed to come to my country and live in it permanently if they want to'. Both redistributive preference variables loaded onto one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (1.26). The same was true of the libertarian pair of preference variables loaded onto one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (1.29). The correlation between leftist and libertarian values is 0.33.
The models include a number of other variables to capture different mechanisms discussed in the literature which might be linking political values, on the one hand, and the frequency and intensity of extra-institutional participation, on the other. The most important ones measure different degrees of satisfaction with democracy and organisational membership. Democratic satisfaction is a continuous scale where 0 means very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in the respondent's country and 10 means very satisfied. Some scholars argue that democratic satisfaction means that people accept that others also are playing by the rules and that the system is not rigged, and therefore that this is a spur to political engagement (Farah, 1979) . Others have suggested that dissatisfaction may spur political activism (Norris, 2011 (Norris, , 1999 . Most importantly, for our present purpose, we believe that this variable sheds light on what explains the link between political values and extra-institutional participation. If the inclusion of this variable in the models reduces a large part of the effect of political values, this indicates that it plays a mediating role, explaining why individuals with certain types of political values are more likely to participate in political action.
Organizational membership is a continuous variable measuring the number of organizations with which the respondent had been involved in the past 12 months. We prefer this more finegrained indicator to another, often used in research, on the impact of organisational embeddedness on political participation, which simply distinguishes between individuals who are members of at least one organisation and those who are not. Individuals who are members of more organisations are more likely to be mobilised to political action, either by other members asking them or by the spread of information about protests organised by their and other organizations (Diani and McAdam, 2003; Schussman and Soule, 2005) . Again, a reduction in the effect for either economic or social values with the inclusion of this variable will suggest that the reason left-wing and/or libertarian individuals are more likely to engage in extra-institutional actions is that their values lead them to joining organisations which then mobilise them to participate politically. We also include a variable for institutional participation (The activities included were: voted; contacted a politician; worn a badge or campaign sticker; donated money to a political campaign. Principal component analysis showed all four items loaded only on one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (1.5)). The inclusion of this variable allows us to test whether individuals who engage in extra-institutional participation shun institutional participation, as several scholars have suggested (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Norris, 2002) .
In addition, we include a number of controls which allow us to deal with previous accounts of extra-institutional participation. First, there is gender, because the literature has typically shown that men are more likely to engage in extra-institutional activism than women (Schussman and Soule, 2005) . Second, we include a variable for cohorts or generations, because the literature argues that younger cohorts will be more likely than older generations to engage in extra-institutional activism gaining prominence and becoming more widespread since the 1960s (Grasso 2014) . Third, the literature tends to argue that more-educated people will be more likely to engage in political actions and extra-institutional activities in particular, given cognitive mobilisation (Grasso 2013) . Fourth, we test the role of occupation and employment status, because scholarship on political participation tends to argue that individuals in the middle classes, and also students, will be more likely to engage (Schussman and Soule, 2005) . The idea of resources is particularly prominent in the political science literature and the resource model of political participation (Verba et al., 1995) . In contrast, grievance theories (Buechler, 2004) tend to argue that it is those who are relatively deprived and resource poor that will engage in protest activities because these are one of the few resources they have available to make their demands heard. Moreover we control for unemployed status given claims this could be a spur for participation amongst a growing 'precariat' (Standing 2011) . Table 1 provides a demographic snapshot of protesters in the sample.
Each variable is included in step-wise, nested models to determine how much of the effect of political values is captured with the addition of each explanatory or control variable, and to attempt to account for the relationship between political values -whether economic or social -with both forms of protest participation. We include the variable for frequency of demonstrating in the models predicting the number of extra-institutional activities engaged in, and the number of extrainstitutional activities in which engaged in in the models predicting frequency of demonstrating, to determine whether these two different measures are related. Similarly, we include social values in the models aiming to explain the relationship between protest activism and left economic values, whereas we include economic values at the end in the models aiming to explain the relationship between protest activism and libertarian social values. 
Findings
Moving to the findings, Table 2 and Figure 1 show that the mean value on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means Free market and 5 means Redistributive, for someone engaging in 0 out of 6 activities, is 3.73, whereas for someone engaging in 4 or more it is 4.50. To recall, the activities included were: petitions; boycotting; buying products for political reasons; strike action; direct action; violent forms of action. The mean value on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means Authoritarian and 5 means Libertarian, for someone engaging in 0 out of 6 activities, is 2.69, whereas for someone engaging in 4 or more it is 3.67. Clearly, there is a strong positive relationship between being more economically redistributive and engaging in a greater number of activities in a given year. Similarly, there is a strong positive relationship between being more socially libertarian and engaging in a greater number of activities in a given year. The results are very similar when we look at frequency of protest (see Table 3 and Figure 2 ). The mean value on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means Free market and 5 means Redistributive, for someone attending only 1 demonstration, is 3.93, whereas for someone engaging in 4 or more it is 4.61. Also from Table 3 , the mean value on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means Authoritarian and 5 means Libertarian, for someone engaging in 0 out of 6 activities, is 2.96, whereas for someone engaging in 4 or more it is 4.06. Again, being more left-wing and also being more socially libertarian have strong positive effects on extra-institutional participation.
We now turn to the mixed-effects Poisson models. There is a strong positive effect of more economically leftist values on intensity of engagement in extra-institutional activities (Table A1 , Online 2.69*** 2.91*** 3.18*** 3.38*** 3.67*** Notes: Significance stars based on ANOVA and one-tailed comparison of means tests, based on total sample N = 10,012.
Appendix), and the same holds true for more social libertarian values (Table A2 , Online Appendix) as with both social and economic values on frequency of protest (Tables A3 and A4 , Online Appendix). This evidence therefore confirms hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4. By and large, while most effects are similar for the two dependent measures of protest participation, it is striking that gender is significant across all models in Tables A1 and A2 (Online Appendix) when predicting intensity; however, when considering the dependent variable for frequency in Tables A3 and A4 (Online Appendix), gender is no longer a significant effect. A similar pattern exists for cohort effects. These findings suggest that frequency is less likely to be patterned by socio-demographics than intensity, and is rather more likely to be linked to other variables known to affect protest, such as commitment and network effects. To explain the relationship between intensity of engagement in extra-institutional activities and more economically redistributive values (Table A1 , Online Appendix), the greatest reduction in the effect of the coefficient for values occurs with the inclusion of organizational membership in Model 7, confirming hypothesis H5. Furthermore, frequency of demonstrating in Model 9, institutional participation in Model 8, and libertarian social values in Model 10, appear to mediate this relationship; that is, they also remove part of the effect when controlled for in these models. This suggests that more economically redistributive people engage in more extra-institutional activities because they tend to become members of organizations which mobilise them to action, and to be individuals who are generally very politically active -both in the extra-and institutional repertoires. In short, it appears having leftist values leads individuals to join organizations mobilising them to activism. A different pattern can be observed when it comes to explaining the relationship between engagement in extra-institutional activities and more libertarian social values (Table A2 , Online Appendix). Here, the greatest reduction in the effect of the coefficient for values occurs with the inclusion of democratic (dis-)satisfaction in Model 6, confirming hypothesis H6. In addition, frequency of demonstrating in Model 9, and economic social values in Model 10, reduce the effect when included in the models. To a lesser extent, institutional participation also appears to mediate this relationship. This suggests that, where organizational membership is particularly important for explaining why individuals with more economically leftist values engaged in a greater number of extra-institutional activities, it appears that what explains why more social libertarian people tend to engage in more protest actions is that they are dissatisfied with democracy, leading them to engage politically, and particularly through extra-institutional means.
In terms of explaining the relationship between greater frequency of protest and more economically redistributive values (Table A3 , Online Appendix), the greatest reduction in the effect of values occurs with the inclusion of organizational membership (Model 7), again confirming hypothesis H5, and extra-institutional activism (in Model 9), and there is also some effect of institutional participation (Model 8) and libertarian social values (Model 10). Interestingly, therefore, this shows a pattern for explaining the effect of economic values on extra-institutional activism since the results are very similar in this frequency measure to those of the count measure of activities (Table A1 , Online Appendix). The main narrative here appears to be that more economically redistributive individuals are more likely to engage with organisations, and to be mobilised to engage politically, through both institutional and extra-institutional means.
Just as with the count measure, explaining the relationship between greater frequency of protest and more libertarian social values (Table A4 , Online Appendix) (dis-)satisfaction with democracy stands as an important factor. Organizational membership, institutional participation, extra-institutional participation and also having more redistributive economic values contribute to reducing the effect. Overall, results suggests that while economic values' impact on protest activism is underpinned by organisational embeddedness, on the other hand, for libertarianism it is the desire to voice discontent with the present arrangements that instead appears more relevant, as shown for intensity. The relative reduction in the effect sizes when these variables are included in the models are shown in Figure 3 . 1 
Conclusion
Extra-institutional forms of political participation have become increasingly important and widespread, and values are an important driver of political participation. We have investigated the impact of political values on the intensity and frequency of protest participation; and our study has a number of important features which allow us to develop on previous research and extend knowledge in the field. Theoretically, the most important feature is embedded in our main goal: disentangling the relationship between political values and different degrees of engagement in extra-institutional activities. We accomplished this by looking at both high intensity and lower incidence activists. This is a feature of our study for which only the type of data from activist surveys that we are using provides. At the same time, it is important to stress that, given these data, our analysis and findings should be interpreted as applying only to actual protesters. If panel data were available in the future we would be able to test for any feedback effects from participation to values in turn. The key finding of our investigation is that, while both economically redistributive values and libertarian social values are important for engaging in a number of extra-institutional activities and for protesting frequently, we observed a different impact of economic and social value priorities on extra-institutional activism. For both the count measure and the frequency measure, the results of the data analysis show that more economically redistributive individuals are more likely to join organizations that facilitate the spread of information from other similar organisations and agencies with the result of mobilising them to both extra-institutional and institutional political action. Those individuals that are more economically redistributive are more likely to participate in a range of activities, and this in turn might be because their political beliefs and their distaste for inequality are likely to provide strong motivations to engage politically in order to change the current institutions. Particularly in the context of the economic crisis, factors such as austerity and wide-ranging budget cuts disproportionately affecting the poorest could impel them to voice their disagreement with principles they do not share (della Porta 2015; Giugni and Grasso 2017; Grasso et al. 2017b) .
In contrast, (dis-)satisfaction with democracy stands out as the main driving factor linking libertarian social values to protest activism (Farah, 1979) . It therefore seems that more socially libertarian people are particularly (dis-)satisfied with the gap between promise and reality in West European democracies -for example, as symbolised in the convergence between major parties leaving no room for democratic choice Temple et al. 2016; Streeck and Mertens 2013) , or the curtailment of civil liberties and the substantial powers afforded to the police and other authorities in the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent discourse on the need for social control and monitoring to avoid potential threats (Tarrow, 2015) . 2 Notes 1. Additionally, we ran some interaction tests on the full models (not shown here but available from the authors) to test for moderator effects and found significant effects for both organizational membership with respect to economic values (for both measures of protest) and for democratic dissatisfaction with respect to social values (for the intensity measure). We also found significant effects for the interaction between economically redistributive and socially libertarian values for both dependent variables. These results thus provide evidence also of moderator effects: economic and social values translate more easily into participation the broader the organizational membership networks and the more felt the feelings of democratic dissatisfaction. Moreover, we also found some evidence of moderator effects between the values showing that the more one is economically redistributive the greater the likelihood that social libertarian values will also be activated into participation and vice-versa. This fits into previous findings that left-libertarians are key constituencies of social movements (Kriesi, 1989) . 2. '9/11' refers to the attacks on the World Trade Center buildings in New York on 11 September 2001.
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